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E
ducation is widely believed to play an important
role in economic development. Countries with
better educated work forces tend to have higher
incomes, less poverty and slower rates of
population growth than those with less well
educated workforces. These are attractive goals for devel-
oping countries and in pursuit of them they spend, on
average, about 10% of their national income on education.
One reason why public policy-makers are willing to invest
so much in education is because they believe that educa-
tion makes workers more productive. But are they right? 
More school means more pay?
Since the early 1970s much research has been devoted to
measuring what economists call the returns to schooling,
that is the proportional change in earnings which comes
from one additional year of schooling. There is now
overwhelming evidence that education and earnings are
closely linked. Workers in low-income countries, for
example, earn just over 11% more for each additional year
they spend at school. Similarly, workers who have
completed primary school can expect to earn 35% more
than those with no formal schooling. 
Does it mean more work?
But while there is little doubt that more educated workers
are paid higher wages, it is not so clear whether they are
also more productive. The first step towards answering this
question would be to determine whether firms actually pay
workers according to their productivity. Easier said than
done, however. Finding data which provide information
both about the wages of individual workers and how much
they contribute to a firm’s output is next to impossible. But
there is a unique set of data from Ghana which does just
that: it combines information on individual workers with
information on the firms where they are employed. The
figures come from a survey of 200 manufacturing firms
organized under the World Bank’s Regional Programme for
Enterprise Development (RPED) and were collected during
the summers of 1992, 1993 and 1994. 
The data collected are extremely rich for an industrial survey
and provide numerous indicators of how firms in Ghana have
performed since the early 1990s. Most important, these data
also include information on a sub-sample of workers
employed by the firms in the RPED sample. Up to twenty
workers were interviewed from each firm. While this number
may seem small by developed country standards, the
average size of a firm in the RPED sample is only eighteen:
in other words, the sub-sample could often include all
workers employed by the firm. Workers who were inter-
viewed for the survey were asked about their educational
background, work experience, on-the-job training, wages,
benefits and numerous other personal characteristics. 
Learning from Ghana
The World Bank data enabled us to establish, first of all,
whether educated workers in Ghana are more productive
than those with no formal schooling. We found strong
Education is highly valued, especially in developing countries. 
But what economic benefits does it bring? Specifically, are more
educated workers more productive? The author reports on her 
findings from a study of employees in Ghana.
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evidence that in the Ghanaian manufacturing sector the
more educated the worker, the more productive they are.
Workers with secondary schooling, for example, are
approximately 46% more productive than workers with no
formal schooling. Specifically, a one-year increase in the
average level of education within a firm is associated with a
7% rise in worker productivity. Remarkably, this rise in
labour productivity is almost identical to the estimated
returns to schooling for manufacturing workers in the RPED
sample. The average Ghanaian worker receives a 7.1%
pay increase for each additional year of education acquired. 
We also found clear evidence that this productivity
improvement holds between groups of workers with differ-
ent levels of education, with those workers with higher
levels of education having higher levels of productivity.
Workers who completed tertiary education are approxi-
mately 25% more productive than those who only went as
far as secondary school.
The richness of the RPED data meant we could also investi-
gate the value of vocational training. In Ghana vocational
training is run almost entirely outside the formal educational
system. In 1991 there were approximately 1100 vocational
schools, of which 160 were public, 250 were private and
about 700 were unregistered, private institutions. More than
95% of the 634,233 students who chose to acquire
vocational training chose private schools run entirely outside
the public school system. So it is worth asking whether
these schools are making a significant contribution to
Ghana’s national income by raising the quality of the labour. 
Again, we found that the answer is yes: vocational training
in Ghana does significantly raise the productivity of
manufacturing workers. On average, the productivity of
workers who have acquired vocational training qualifica-
tions is between 72 and 78 percentage points higher than
workers with no formal schooling. These results are striking
and encouraging, given the current controversy over the
usefulness of vocational training in developing countries. 
Do the workers benefit?
One of the most consistent results in applied economics is
the very large returns to educational investments. On
average, workers in OECD countries gain approximately
7% in earnings for every additional year of schooling they
acquire. The payoff to educational investments is even
greater for workers who work in developing countries.
Workers in sub-Saharan Africa gain 13%, while workers in
Latin America and the Caribbean, and Asia (non-OECD)
gain 12% and 10%, respectively. But what do these
returns mean? Much controversy has arisen over how to
interpret the returns to schooling estimated by standard
econometric techniques. In particular, researchers have
questioned whether the estimated returns reflect the true
productivity-enhancing effects of education or whether they
simply reflect other factors, like ability, which closely match
a worker’s level of education. 
While there is a growing consensus that such problems do
not significantly affect the estimated returns to education for
workers in OECD countries, there is still a great deal of
scepticism over the accuracy of such estimates for workers
in developing countries. In particular, sceptics have criti-
cised the usefulness of estimated returns to schooling in
countries where a majority of the labour force does not
earn wages but instead makes a living by non-wage activi-
ties like trading in goods or subsistence farming. In our
study, we cannot resolve this issue but we have found new
evidence on the extent to which the estimated returns to
schooling for workers in the manufacturing sector of Ghana
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By Patricia Jones
Source: RPED data. * indicates that the coefficient is statistically significant. All catagories indicate the rise
in earnings (or productivity) compared to workers with no formal schooling. **These coefficients reflect the
rise in earnings (or productivity) associated with one additional year of schooling.
Education The private returns to schooling Changes in productivity Statistically different?
Years of education** 7.0* – 7.1* – no
Primary School – 7.9 – 29.7* no
Secondary School – 53.8* – 55.5* no
Tertiary School – 78.9* – 90.7* no
Table 1 The returns to schooling and changes in productivity at different levels of education
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Ghanaian firms, at least those in the manufacturing sector, do pay competitive wages and
therefore act in much the same manner as manufacturing firms in the developed world.
reflect real differences in the productivity of these workers. 
Over twenty-five years ago, Jacob Mincer (in 1973) demon-
strated a method for estimating the returns to schooling:
that is, the proportional change in wages associated with
one additional year of education. We used his model to
estimate the private returns to schooling for Ghanaian
workers in the manufacturing sector. The RPED data reveal
that there are large monetary rewards to becoming
educated in Ghana. Workers with secondary schooling are
paid nearly 30% more than workers with no formal school-
ing. Similarly, workers with secondary schooling are paid
more than 25% higher wages than workers who left school
after primary education. The greatest jump in wages,
however, occurs for workers who have completed tertiary
education. These workers earn approximately 35% more
than workers who left school after secondary education. In
other words, educated workers are not only more produc-
tive than workers with no formal schooling: they also earn
higher wages. 
Are Ghanaian wages competitive?
We decided to go even further in our inquiry, by trying to
establish whether firms pay competitive wages: that is,
wages that reflect how much the worker contributes to firm
output. Although this assumption forms a crucial corner-
stone of microeconomic theory, there is little empirical
evidence to support its validity, and none from a developing
country. Indeed it is often assumed that firms in poor
countries operate under a different set of rules to those in
rich countries. Our analysis, however, provides strong
evidence that Ghanaian firms, at least those in the manufac-
turing sector, do pay competitive wages and therefore act
in much the same manner as manufacturing firms in the
developed world.
We first needed to determine whether firms actually pay
workers according to their productivity. While standard
economic theory assumes this to be the case, a number of
competing theories of wage determination present counter
arguments as to why it may be optimal for firms not to pay
competitive wages. They may, for example, find it profitable
to pay workers lower wage rates when the workers are in
training or relatively young. In addition, it may take firms
some time to assess the productivity of new workers,
resulting in new recruits being paid wages which are either
higher or lower than the value of the goods and services
which they produce. Any of these scenarios could result in
a differential between the value of wages a worker receives
and the value of output that he or she produces. 
Only empirical research can resolve the issue of how firms
set wages. Unfortunately, little research has been carried
out on this issue because of a lack of basic data on firms’
wage-setting practices. To assess whether workers are
paid the value of their output, one needs information on
both the level of workers’ wages and the exact value of
what they produce. Collecting such data is not easy, given
the problems involved in most business environments with
measuring the output of any single individual. The data we
had for Ghana, however, provided information both on the
education of workers in each firm and the average value of
output produced by those workers. With this information
we are able to estimate how much workers at each level of
education contribute to firm output using a technique
known as production function analysis. 
It is often assumed that firms in poor countries are less
competitive than firms in rich countries. One way of assess-
ing the competitive nature of firms is to determine whether
or not they pay their workers competitive wages. In perfectly
competitive product and labour markets, firms that do not
pay competitive wages will eventually go out of business
because they will be unable to compete with firms that do
pay competitive wages. To find out what Ghanaian firms do,
we compared the results obtained in the earnings analysis to
those obtained in the production function analysis.
From the earnings analysis we derive estimates of the
private returns to schooling: that is, the proportional change
in earnings associated with different levels of schooling.
Likewise, from the production function analysis we obtain
estimates of the average rise in productivity associated with
different levels of schooling. Theoretically, the two sets of
results should be identical when firms pay workers compet-
itive wages. Table 1 (previous page) shows that they are
indeed very similar. For example, workers with secondary
schooling earn 56% more and produce 54% more than
workers with no formal schooling. Likewise, workers with
tertiary schooling earn 91% more and produce 80% more
than workers with no formal schooling. (This gap is not so
wide as it first appears.)
Lessons for others
Our findings unequivocally show the importance of educa-
tion in the Ghanain manufacturing sector. They also show
that the Ghanaian labour market works remarkably well,
even by developed country standards, with clear evidence
to suggest that firms pay their workers competitive wages. 
Perhaps most important, though, our results suggest that
the estimated returns to schooling based on Mincer’s
model provide a relatively good estimate of the productivity-
enhancing effects of education (at least, for workers in the
manufacturing sector). The clear lesson for public policy-
makers who often rely on such estimates when judging the
value of different educational investments, is that these
estimates reflect increases in productivity as well as
earnings. In Ghana, at least, education pays handsome
dividends: for workers, firms and the state.
Patricia Jones is a member of the CEP’s Labour
Markets Programme
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M
edia stereo-typing would have us
believe that the United Kingdom
economy is doomed to suffer the
crippling effects of ageing. An ageing
society, the demographic time bomb,
the burden of the elderly Ð all these
somewhat alarming phrases are trotted
out at regular intervals. There has been a particular spate
of such references recently with the publication of several
reports and government policy documents. Most promi-
nent of these were, first, last year’s Government green
paper on pensions, and second, the report of the Royal
Commission on Long-Term Care, published earlier this
year. There has also been a study on the effect of
demographic change on social spending during the next
century by the National Institute for Economic and Social
Research. But are those who would have us believe a
crisis is imminent right? Or is the picture less gloomy than
the doom-mongers like to think?
One clue might lie in a report which was largely ignored in
the UK, produced by the Brookings Institution in
Washington, DC. This compares the impact of ageing on
the major economies of the developed world. Its basic
message is that in comparison with its major competitors,
the UK is remarkably well placed to cope with the
demographic transition to an older society. One particular
advantage the UK may have in the next century is the
restraint we have shown by not promising high pensions
we cannot afford. The UK has also gone further than most
countries down the road of relying on private pensions;
and proposes to go even further. This may produce a
higher level of savings available for productive investment
and, in turn, a higher growth rate. 
But economists are by no means agreed on the 
prognosis; nor is it clear what the results will be for the
elderly population, as opposed to the economy as a whole.
We are in uncharted waters, where the voyage itself is of
considerable importance. The lessons from the UK’s
experience will be carefully watched in other countries.
The study of pension provision, social exclusion, labour
markets for older people, and their impact on economic
performance more generally, have come together to 
be one of the most important areas of study in 
applied economics. 
Is ageing a problem? 
It is true that, in the next half century, the number of very
elderly people in the UK (those who are 85 and over) will
treble, while the number of those aged between 75 and 84
will nearly double. The numbers of young elderly (those
between 65 and 74) will rise by half in the early part of the
century and then fall back as the lower birth rates of recent
years feed through. Some demographers believe all these
figures may prove to be underestimates, as we find new
ways to extend life. 
It is also true that a larger non-working population has
important implications for the economy. The total amount
produced by those in work has to be shared between
workers and more non-workers. That is true however we
choose to finance pensions or health or long-term care.
Workers may resist the slower rise in their take home pay
needed to pay for pensions by pressing for higher wages.
This may happen whether the slower rise in their wages is
the result of social security taxes or enforced private
pension contributions. The same applies to health and long
term care costs. 
In young countries workers may be saving for their old
age, producing a high savings ratio. In mature elderly
economies the elderly are running down their savings.
Young economies with highly educated work forces will be
more productive and generate more innovation. 
So we should be concerned about the structural issues
that ageing raises. The need to support a larger elderly
population makes the case for raising the productivity of
those in work even more pressing. It makes the waste of
unemployment and premature retirement even more
unacceptable. It makes the case for lifelong learning even
more persuasive. But we should not panic either.
Remember that during the present century the age 
structure of the UK population changed much more
dramatically than it will probably do in the next. The
number of those over 85 has risen fifteen times as fast as
the numbers aged less than 65 – it’s only expected to triple
in the next fifty years! The number of those over 75 rose
seven times as fast and the number of those between 65
and 74 went up three times as fast as the rest of 
the population. 
Most of these changes happened after 1931. Yet this was
the period in which we introduced universal pensions and
health care for all. So the really rapid and large fiscal
adjustments to the population structure have already been
made. The UK industrialised first, extended its life
expectancy and reduced its fertility early, and has therefore
come to terms with the prospects of an ageing population
to a greater extent than any other nation. It has also
sustained its fertility more successfully than many other
European countries, thus reducing the impact of an 
ageing population. 
The really serious problems will arise in nations that are
currently promising their future elderly populations state
pensions that cannot be remotely met from present taxes
and social security contribution rates. That goes for much
of continental Europe and Japan. It is less true in the USA
but adjustments will be needed even there and especially to
cover the rising medical and long term care costs that are
falling on the federal and state budgets. The recent
Brookings Institution report concluded that: “the fiscal
challenge associated with population ageing is astonish-
ingly small in the United Kingdom” (see Table 1 overleaf).
By Howard Glennerster
Table 1 Present value of net public pension liabilities 
as a percentage of GDP 
France 115
Germany 110
Japan 105
USA 25
UK 5
Source: Bosworth and Burtless Ageing Societies 1998 
By contrast with other industrial countries successive
British governments have made minimal promises to future
pensioners and imposed tight limits on spending on health
and long term care. The main danger for the UK therefore
lies in inadequate and uncertain pension and long term care
provisions that may cause a political backlash from a
frustrated and increasingly powerful grey electorate. The
recent Royal Commission Report on Long-Term Care and
the pensions green paper should be read in this light. 
Long-term care 
Royal Commissions may be appointed in the hope that
everyone will have forgotten the issue by the time that they
report, or that the report will so muddle the issues that
politicians are let off the hook. No such luck with the
Sutherland Commission on long-term care. A fine report
has impaled the Government on a highly visible spike. The
problem is soluble – but at a price. 
The Sutherland Commission concludes that private insur-
ance by individuals to pay for the risks of expensive care in
old age is not going to provide the major source of funding
as it will do for ordinary pensions. Not even in the United
States, with its highly developed market for private health
insurance, has the long term care insurance market taken
off. Only 5% of Americans have long-term care insurance,
much of it with major exclusions and from which many drop
out before their policies mature. The reasons are well
understood by economists. Long-term care is subject to
high uncertainty – not predictable risks. The technology of
care forty years hence is impossible to predict. So is the
nature of disability and medical advances. Risks are linked.
A great deal of care is undertaken by partners and children
today, so that even a tiny shift in partners’ and families’
willingness to care would produce big changes in a
company’s liabilities. To safeguard themselves private insur-
ers significantly limit the scale of benefits they offer, make
them discretionary and make their products expensive. Few
want to buy this distant product when they are young and
the insurance is affordable. Since the state is obliged not to
abandon the very old and frail so people naturally gamble
on the state supporting them if all else fails. All the classic
elements of market failure are present in even more power-
ful forms than with health care. 
So the case for some kind of social funding is powerful, at
least for the personal and medical care elements of long-
term care where most of the market failure effects are felt.
That leaves open whether the provision of services
themselves should be publicly provided or not. In many
cases care will be provided by private and voluntary organi-
sations as it is now. However, it is not clear why the State
should provide food and housing free simply because an
individual is receiving nursing care. Most people can and
do afford these from their retirement income or the housing
assets they have acquired during their lives. Consumers’
tastes for rooms of their own, large or small rooms, TV,
good food or rose gardens are best left to the market to
sort out. Here there is ample scope for the pensions and
mortgage and special housing markets to develop, once
the state has secured the largely uninsurable risks associ-
ated with long term personal and health care at a basic
level. Thus the Royal Commission proposed that these
functions should continue to paid for by individuals where
they were able. 
But a separate group of Commission members signed a
Minority Report: they would confine state support to
medical and nursing care, not extending it to personal care.
This is unsustainable. Research many years ago at the LSE
and elsewhere showed that the range of personal functions
performed for people in residential homes overlapped
massively with that performed in so called nursing homes
by nurses. It would prove impossible to define nursing care
more narrowly than the functions nurses currently perform.
If such care carried state funding anything done in residen-
tial homes would get redefined as nursing care. In 1948 the
boundaries of the National Health Service were drawn in an
illogical way to distinguish health care from what came later
to be called social care. If someone suffers from an incur-
able and lasting condition like Alzheimer’s disease they
must pay for their care and sell their house to do so if
necessary. If they suffer from cancer the NHS will pay. The
Commission extends the boundary of free health care to
include personal care like washing, bathing, feeding,
administering medication, managing incontinence and
ensuring personal safety. This is done in residential care
and in people’s own homes and can often be done by
families. 
Ordinary people involved in our Kafka-like care system
cannot understand why if someone employed by the NHS
baths them and gets them up in the morning they receive
such services free. If someone paid by the local authority
does the same they must sell their house. If they suffer from
cancer they are cared for free. If they suffer from
Alzheimer’s they pay. About certain things ordinary people
are simply right.
Is the extra cost sustainable? The authors of the Minority
Report called it a “Croesian flood of expenditure”. One can
only conclude that their journalistic pens ran away with their
sense of judgement here. The Majority Report’s claims its
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The really serious problems will arise in nations that are currently 
promising their future elderly populations state pensions that cannot be
remotely met from present taxes and social security contribution rates.
proposals would increase the percentage of the GDP
devoted by the Government to this activity from 1.2% of the
GDP to 1.4% by the year 2051. The report does not entirely
adjust its calculations to take account of the possible
additional offers of support families might claim for their own
provision of personal care. However, even if the Commission
were wrong in its projections by a factor of 100% we would
be talking about 1.6% of the GDP going on the public sector
costs of long-term care instead of 1.2%. The Government’s
pensions proposals (see below) are designed to shift the
cost of funding pensions from the Exchequer to the individ-
ual. They decrease the future tax liability of government far
more than the Royal Commission’s plans would increase it.
Governments should do what they do best and leave
markets to do what they do best. Provision for income in
retirement is something markets do moderately well. In the
case of long term care they do not. In this sense the
Pensions Green Paper and the Royal Commission Report
could be seen to be complementary, not, as some have
suggested, moving in opposite directions. 
New Labour, new pensions policy
Ever since the Second World War the United Kingdom has
been following a different path to financing retirement than
most other advanced industrialised countries. It began with
a flat rate pension which was originally set below the basic
poverty line and never raised above it. That encouraged
large numbers of the population to take out occupational
pensions: the Conservative governments of 1979-97 also
encouraged people to take out personal private pensions.
This approach enabled those Governments steadily to
reduce the value of the state basic pension relative to
earnings so that it is worth today only about 15% of
average earnings for a single person.
The latest Government proposals take the UK even further
down the road to private self-sufficiency while at the same
time concentrating more public funds on pensions for the
poorer sections of the community. The Green Paper
proposes:
n To allow the basic Beveridge pension to wither. Now
worth 15% of average earnings it will fall to 7.5% on
reasonable assumptions by 2050. 
n To raise the level of income support for the over 65s in
line with the earnings of those in the labour force. 
n To abolish the State Earnings Related Pension Scheme
(SERPS) introduced by the Labour Government of
1974-79 and replace it with a new State Second
Pension (SSP). This will provide improved second
pensions for people earning below £9,000 a year and
those who are caring for children or the old or the
disabled. Those earning between £9,000 and £18,000
will also benefit but not as much.
n Private stakeholder pensions will be introduced to provide
a cheaper, more regulated and simpler form of saving for
old age for those on low incomes.
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If they suffer from cancer they
are cared for free.
The overall effect will be to shift the balance of funding for
pensions: from the present ratio of 60:40 public to private
funding to the reverse,40:60, by mid-century. The intention
is to raise the incomes of the poorest lifetime earners above
the limits of means tested income support by mid-century. 
Given that the state has performed so badly in providing
financial support for the elderly, and that the average voter
has opted out into the private sector, there was probably no
other politically sustainable route. However, the Green
Paper at no point attempts to justify aiming for a 60:40
private-public balance of funding, or to weigh the costs and
benefits. There may well be macro-economic advantages in
encouraging moderately paid workers to take out personal
pensions but there are also risks.
The new stakeholder pensions will be individual, defined
contribution, funded schemes. The amount of an individual’s
pension will depend on:
1. The amount and timing of the contributions;
2. the performance of the pension fund which depends 
in its turn on the management of the fund and the
performance of financial markets;
3. the value of the annuity the contributor will have 
to purchase on retirement;
4. age at retirement;
5. the state of the annuities market;
6. inflation during retirement;
7. ignorance of the complexities of the capital market. 
Such defined contribution schemes are open to considerable
risks under each heading, especially in the case of women
who act as carers or simply wives and mothers. Given these
risks, why is the Government so keen to see a continuing
shift to private pensions? 
In common mythology since private schemes are funded you
are sure to get the pension you paid for. The Pru can be
trusted, governments can’t. Given the poor deal British
governments have handed out in the past, this may seem
persuasive. But private schemes are only as good as the
fund managers, the market and the performance of the
economy will allow. All pensions are a claim on the resources
of the economy when people reach old age. All pensions are
a claim on the then workers. The easiest way for future
workers to keep the fruits of their labour is to generate wage-
induced inflation that private pension schemes cannot match.
Financial markets are volatile. An annuity purchased last
August was worth a lot more than one purchased last
December. What matters above all is the future level of
output in the economy and its capacity to meet not just the
rising aspirations of workers but of past workers too. 
The Brookings Institution study summarised the balance
sheet concisely:
The United Kingdom will face a smaller increase than
in the other G-5 countries in public spending on the
elderly and will accumulate substantially greater
reserves in its (increasingly private) pension system. If
its budget deficit is kept low, the growing
accumulations in private pension accounts can help
boost national saving, which in turn can increase the
rate of economic growth. These policies may,
however, expose workers to greater risk of low
retirement incomes. Workers who invest their
retirement funds recklessly or in excessively
conservative, low yield securities may be forced to
accept pensions that are low in comparison to their
net incomes while at work. And if workers should
retire after a lengthy period in which private markets
yield low or negative returns, an entire cohort of them
may be faced with the prospect of low retirement
incomes. It is tempting to say that a shortfall in
retirement income is solely a problem for the
unfortunate workers, but it also might be a problem for
the public budget if voters demand that public
pensions or pension guarantees assure workers of
good incomes in retirement.
Even if all the Government’s plans to secure the worth of
private pensions succeeded there would remain a large
problem for women, for those whose marriages break up,
and for those who spend periods out of the labour market.
That applies even for those in the Government’s Second
State Pension. The main recipients of pensions are women.
The reforms do something for women but nothing like
enough. The Second State Pension does provide credits
for those bringing up children under five or looking after
disabled relatives. Those who cannot or do not want to
enter the labour force when their children pass five will end
up with a reduced pension. This is more pronounced
because the new pension system works on the assumption
that the normal working life is full-time for 40 years – even
though this is rarely true for either men or more especially
women. There is no provision for the 2 million women who
earn under the lower earnings limit. Periods of unemploy-
ment; long term sickness; extended periods of caring for
children; periods of low pay below the earnings limit;
periods lost to work after divorce or separation; time out for
education: these can all reduce pension entitlements. For
all these reasons many women, especially those who
cannot rely on a husband’s pension, and many men will end
up drawing a pension below the income support level,
despite having paid contributions throughout their lives.
Many will experience retirement at the margins of income
support levels. This is also made worse by the fact that the
state provided pension will continue to fall in relation to
earnings while the level of income support will not. Many
who are not dependent on income support when they retire
will soon fall back onto it as the pension is overtaken by
income support levels. 
Some of these design faults could be addressed reason-
ably simply. Others would need more radical changes. The
coverage of the Second State Pension could be made
more comprehensive by extending the scope of credits for
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The main danger for the UK therefore lies in inadequate and uncertain
pension and long-term care provisions that may cause a political backlash
from a frustrated and increasingly powerful grey electorate.
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non-paid work in the home and for caring and including
periods of genuine unemployment. The period of eligibility
for a pension could be reduced. Second State Pension
rights could be made inheritable, with at least 50% of the
deceased partner’s rights passing to the survivor. Benefits
for older pensioners will need to rise if the costs of long
term care are to fall more on the individual. More radically
the basic pension, or a new elder citizens benefit, could be
linked to earnings but taxed away for richer pensioners as
happens in Australia. The costs of some of these reforms
could be met by capping the value of the tax reliefs for
private pensions as the Government are proposing to do
for Stakeholder pensions. 
Early retirement 
The focus on the ageing of the population has tended to
distract attention away from a much more immediate
problem: the early movement out of the labour force,
whether voluntarily or through enforced job loss. Recent
trends are striking and disturbing. At a time when people
are living longer and more healthy lives in old age, men’s
attachment to the labour market is ending earlier and
earlier. So too are their contributions to their own old age. 
An analysis of the Labour Force Survey data by Nigel
Campbell, on leave from H.M. Treasury with CASE, shows
the changes. Men born in the early 1920s were still
predominantly at work in their 60s: but each successive
cohort since has been leaving the labour market earlier. In
1979 90% of men were in work until nearly 60. By 1997
the fall in male employment seemed to be beginning at 50!
(see Figures 1 and 2 below)
The picture is rather different for women. Their participation
has grown over the past twenty years but still declines
sharply after the age of fifty. (see figures 3 and 4 overleaf).
With most of the population heading for some form of
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The need to support a larger elderly population
makes the case for raising the productivity of those
in work even more pressing. 
education until their early twenties, and living until their late
seventies, less than thirty years in work will make their
retirement very difficult to finance. The pensions they will be
able to buy on a money purchase basis at age fifty will be
very small.
Yet the structure of pensions and benefits in the past, as
well as the labour market may have been one of the
reasons for early retirement: more educated people
working in the public sector with pensions linked to their
final salaries were easily tempted by early retirement
packages. The incentives to go onto Invalidity Benefit in the
past may have been another factor. 
All this underlines the extent to which policy must be
informed by a clear understanding of the factors at work,
and how they relate to each other. It is crucial to under-
stand the relative importance of the factors at work to
inform policy. The Government has set about this and the
1999 Budget began the process of encouraging older
workers to return to work and giving employers incentives
to employ them. 
The ageing population does present big challenges for
policy-makers. Britain may be better placed to cope than
many other countries, but that doesn’t mean that there
aren’t risks associated with policy decisions: this is, after
all, an area of considerable uncertainty. It is one of the
central functions of research centres like CASE and the
CEP to reduce those areas of uncertainty wherever possi-
ble and to ensure that policymakers are properly informed
about decisions which by their very nature will have unusu-
ally far-reaching implications for all of us.
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At a time when people are living longer and more healthy lives in old
age, men’s attachment to the labour market is ending earlier and earlier.
So too are their contributions to their own old age. 
T
he new single European currency, the euro,
started life on January 1 this year. Eleven member
states of the European Union have irrevocably
fixed their exchange rates and will abolish their
national currencies altogether within three years,
when euro notes and coins start circulating.
Britain is one of four countries which chose not to join
economic and monetary union: the Blair government is
sympathetic to the idea of joining at some stage, but has
pledged to hold a referendum before committing the UK to
membership. The issue remains highly controversial, crossing
traditional political boundaries, dividing old colleagues and
uniting former political enemies. Emotion often clouds the
debate, making it difficult for those undecided to work out
where the balance of the argument lies.
In an attempt to clarify the views of those for and against
joining, CentrePiece asked Janet Bush, director of the New
Europe campaign which is pro-Europe but against UK
membership of the euro, and Christopher Johnson, a
leading figure in the Association for Monetary Union in
Europe, to engage in debate. We began by asking both to
respond to a series of questions.
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Christopher Johnson
The euro is a success so far by
several criteria. Its convergence
criteria made not just 11, but all
15 EU countries undertake
unprecedented efforts to reduce
both inflation and fiscal deficits. It
began on time on 4 January
1999. It is starting to be used as
a trading currency, and as a
financial currency, with euro bond issues exceeding dollar
bonds so far this year. It has not yet caught on as an
investment currency, because the stock markets of the
euro area cannot yet compare with Wall Street, in size,
liquidity, or performance. 
The fall of the euro exchange rate against the dollar has
been a big surprise, but it has benefits as well as
drawbacks. The depreciation of the euro could give a
boost of up to 1% of GDP to the euro countries, spurring
on their hesitant recovery. The cut of 0.5% in the euro
interest rate will stimulate domestic demand in the major
countries. The idea that the hawks of Frankfurt would
pursue a strong euro policy as a proof of machismo was
always absurd. Germany more than any country requires a
cut in interest rates. It is important that the Germans, more
reluctant than others to lose their national currency, should
see euro monetary policy as being in their interests.
Christopher Johnson
By not joining at the outset, the UK has missed the
chance of taking part in the euro-11 Council of Finance
Janet Bush
It is far too soon to judge whether
the euro is a success or a failure.
All that we have discovered over
the past few months is that the
European single currency goes
up and down – mostly down so
far but that will surely change in
the future. In short, we have
discovered that the euro is a
currency like any other. Current weakness is no more
proof of the euro’s failure than a bout of strength would
have signified its success.
Nevertheless, the euro’s slide does appear to reflect deep
concerns in the market about how the euroland economy
is faring within the straitjacket of Economic and Monetary
Union. Germany is sinking into recession while a country
such as Ireland is battling to contain an inflationary boom.
Neither can do anything about it. Both are being forced to
live, quite inappropriately, with the same interest rate.
What the euro’s first few months have highlighted is the
beauty of floating exchange rates, designed as they are to
act as a natural restorative when things go badly. 
Janet Bush
Britain would have been mad to join on January 1. In the
short-term, it is at a different stage in the economic cycle
Can we now say the euro is a success? Why – or why not?
Should Britain have joined on 1 January 1999? If not, why not?
The euro debate
from most of euroland. At European interest rates, Britain
would soon face an inflationary boom that would put
Ireland’s in the shade. There are, however, many far more
fundamental and long-term reasons. While the pro-EMU
camp seems to struggle for convincing economic reasons
for joining, those opposed to the single currency are spoilt
for choice. 
Euroland is not an optimal currency area. Its economies are
far too different to make monetary union work and the
dangers of a ’one size fits all’ interest rate is already evident
in the cases of Germany and Ireland. The institutional
structure of EMU enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty
compounds this imbalance. The European Central Bank
was conceived in an era when inflation was public enemy
number one and its remit is simply to achieve price stability.
At a time when the major threat is deflation, the ECB’s task
is too narrowly defined. The Stability and Growth Pact’s
strict budget deficit limits, means that fiscal policy is not
available as a counterweight to monetary policy. 
Even if euroland’s prospects were more promising, Britain
is still not a suitable candidate for membership simply
because it is so different from most continental economies.
Take the example of interest rates. Britain has a far greater
penchant for variable rate borrowing which means that
Britain’s GDP is four times as sensitive to changes in
interest rates as the average for European Union countries.
Britain has the most advanced economy in Europe in high-
tech industries. It also has a higher proportion of bio-
chemicals, aircraft, scientific instruments and
telecommunications industries than France, Germany and
Italy. In addition, Britain is an oil economy unlike any other
in the EU.
During the 1980s, Britain went through an often painful
supply side revolution which took us firmly down the
Anglo-Saxon economic route. Having made these choices,
Ministers, and influencing the running of the ECB. The
Bank of England may or may not prove to have installed a
better standard of openness than the ECB, but it has little
chance of influencing the ECB from outside. British
influence on other, related EU issues, such as taxation,
has been weakened by remaining out. Mr Tony Blair’s
forward policy on European defence was seen as a
gesture of goodwill by the other EU countries. It did not
compensate them for the UK’s refusal so far to join the
most dramatic and central form of European integration
since the formation of the EEC in 1958. The City of
London has set up markets in euros, but it is likely to lose
share in the domestic financial markets of the euro area. 
The Government’s changeover plan has set out a series of
time intervals, but no date for joining. It is unlikely that Mr
Blair will decide to join before the election. The most
optimistic schedule is then as follows. The election is likely
to be held in May 2001, after four rather than five years.
The government will announce a decision to join in June
2001, having inevitably indicated during the election
campaign that it was about to do so. The referendum will
be held in October 2001, and the result will be yes,
perhaps by not a very large majority. The UK can then lock
the pound to the euro in January 2002 and take two rather
than three years over the transition period. Any longer
delay would run the risk that the UK and the euro
countries might diverge further, and that the single market
would begin to break up because of exchange rate
instability between the pound and the euro.
All the economic variables will be improved by the UK’s
entry into the euro, particularly given that 11 other
countries will already be reaping the advantages.
Economic growth will be faster, thanks to lower interest
rates, high business investment, and the scale advantages
of buying and selling in a bigger market. Inflation will be
reduced, because the ECB will have greater credibility
than the Bank of England, prices will become more
JB continued
CJ continued
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transparent, and transaction costs in intra-European trade
will be cut. The elimination of different exchange rates will
benefit trade, direct investment, and portfolio investment.
Both borrowers and savers will have access to wider
banking, bond and equity markets, as fragmentation is
reduced and competition increased. Fiscal policy will have
to remain prudent, and private sector bond issuers will be
crowded in to the market vacated by government
borrowers. Under independent economic management,
Britain has seen its living standards fall below those of the
richer European countries, including even Ireland. In EMU,
British living standards will have a chance to catch up with
the rest of Europe. Europe as a whole will have a chance
to catch up with the US, where the advantages of a single
currency in a single market are evident.
CJ
The economic advantages of the euro are not sufficient to
persuade those eurosceptics who believe that the UK
should remain an independent country, sovereign in all
respects. For europhiles, the economic advantages are
compounded by the political benefits of playing a leading
part in the world’s second super-power. In fact, political
influence vis--vis the United States also increases
Europe’s leverage in global negotiations about trade and
finance. The UK punches above its weight in defence and
foreign policy, and could take a lead, alongside France, in
formulating European policies so far lacking in these
areas. Britain’s role should be, not to bolster US policy,
but to influence it as one of the leaders of a European
confederation.
EMU and the EU have a better chance of long-run
success if the UK is a leading member of both
organizations, rather than a fringe player. Euro financial
markets need the City of London, and the City 
needs euro financial markets, if both are to realise their 
full potential. It is not a zero sum game. Both the UK and
its partners will benefit from closer integration. If we do
not like the way the rest of Europe is developing, it is 
up to us to try to change it. Britain is too important to
euroland, and euroland to Britain, for the two to stay 
apart for long.
Britain must resist being dragged backwards. France and
Germany are pushing tax harmonisation, arguing that this
is necessary to make EMU work. For Britain, it is hard not
to be suspicious that this is nothing more than an attempt
to hobble an economy which now benefits from the lowest
corporation tax of any industrialised country in the world.
More worrying still is Germany’s campaign for wage
harmonisation. What motivation could there be other than
an attempt to force other European economies up to
Germany’s wage levels. In a fiercely competitive world
economy, gravitating towards the least competitive
economy in terms of labour costs would be disastrous not
just for Britain but for the rest of euroland.
Britain has no need to join the euro in order to thrive. Britain
exports around 44% of its goods and services and less than
half of that goes to euroland. More than 80% of foreign
investment in Britain comes from outside the EU and more
than 80% of British investment goes outside the EU. 
Britain is exactly the kind of economy that should do well in
a global economy where the winners will be high-tech,
entrepreneurial, relatively fleet of foot, deregulated,
excellent at high value added service industries. Britain
certainly isn’t a perfect place. Nevertheless, it certainly has
no need to lack self-confidence. 
JB
Those who know him say that Tony Blair’s main (only
apparent) reason for wanting the UK to join EMU is to
enhance Britain’s influence in European affairs. I think that
he might be dismayed were a referendum ever held and
won. He would be swapping total domestic control over
the levers of economic policy (as well as the sovereignty of
Parliament) for one voice out of 12. Some argue that, in a
global economy, no nation state enjoys true autonomy over
economic policy but this is too glib. Simply contrast the
aggressive, growth-
oriented programme of
interest rate cuts delivered
recently by the Bank of
England compared with
the head-in-the-sand
conduct of monetary
policy by the ECB.
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How important is UK membership of EMU to the UK’s role within the European Union? 
Is Britain now on the fringes of Europe? Can the UK now be at the heart of Europe?
JB continued
CJ continued
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CJ’s reply to JB
The euro is not “a currency like any other”. Even its
detractors admit this when they point out that there is not a
single government in charge. It also differs in ensuring
exchange rate stability among countries doing well over
half their trade with each other, by the simple expedient of
abolishing exchange rates. There would have been no
“beauty” in keeping floating exchange rates in the EU in the
last year or two. Far from being a palliative for
misalignment, they cause it. However, the fall of the euro
against the dollar was just what Europe needed to regain
competitiveness and stimulate the recovery. 
A decade is far too long to wait to see if the euro “works”.
Business cycles are unlikely to have the same amplitude as
they did in the 1970s and 1980s, which were exceptional
in the postwar period. By 2010, the UK may well have
diverged too far – in the wrong direction – to be able to
take up its rightful place in EMU.
Britain could have joined on 1 January 1999, if the policy
mix had been tilted towards a tighter fiscal policy and a
looser monetary policy. Those who want Britain to have
monetary independence have blamed the Bank of England
for having raised rates too high. Over the years, the UK’s
inability to manage its own monetary policy has been all
too obvious. The cut in interest rates that would have been
needed for Britain to join EMU would have meant less of a
dip in economic growth, with little inflationary danger. The
divergence of the British and European cycles is due
mainly to divergent policies, which could have been
convergent, not to differences of economic structure.
The OECD (in its Economic outlook December 1998)
surveyed fourteen models for the UK and other major
European countries. In only three of them do interest rates
JB
The deadline of January 1 1999 certainly spurred the 11
countries that joined the eurozone to cut their deficits and
bring down inflation. What Christopher Johnson
conveniently doesn’t mention, of course, is that the
Maastricht convergence criteria were widely fudged,
outrageously in some cases, in order to meet that deadline.
This has left many of the eurozone countries with
unsustainably high debt levels. We shall see how these
countries get on during the current economic slowdown.
While deficits and inflation have been brought down,
Europe’s real economic problems – feeble growth and high
unemployment – have been neglected. 
Christopher Johnson is quite wrong to say that the fall in
the euro against the dollar was a big surprise. It was not. It
was perfectly obvious before its launch that, far from being
an oasis of stability as Wim Duisenberg boasted, euroland
would suffer from the implosion of demand in emerging
market economies along with others. The slide in the euro
will, of course, help to cushion euroland from recession but
the conviction of many of euroland’s finance ministers and
central bankers that the euro would swiftly challenge the
dollar’s status as the world’s reserve currency already
looks misplaced.
Even in the warm afterglow of Labour’s landslide, Tony
Blair would have been hard put to win a referendum.
Opinion polls before May 1997 and afterwards have
consistently shown a firm majority of the British people
against the euro. My bet is that this majority will solidify and
grow over the months ahead, particularly as the public
become aware that a vote for the euro is a vote for a drive
towards political union.
Sometimes, the pro-EMU case smacks of desperation.
How many times have I read that we should join because
we enjoy holidays in Tuscany or the Alps and glory in
We then gave both the opportunity to respond to the points each had made:
The euro debate
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French cuisine? Or that we must join, despite deeply
important questions of economic and political sovereignty,
because it is “our destiny” or “inevitable”? Or that the only
people who argue against the single currency are right-
wing, old, backward looking, xenophobic? This debate has
got to be lifted to a higher standard if the British people are
going to be well informed, as they should be in a mature
democracy, in time for a referendum, if one is ever held.
Those who argue for early membership sound panicked as
if somehow Britain will wither away and die outside
euroland. Why are the British so lacking in self-confidence?
Why not enjoy the relative luxury of the opt-out and wait and
see patiently to see how things develop in euroland before
making a decision? EMU is an unprecedented leap in the
dark. It has never been done before. But don’t assume, for
all its ambition, that EMU is going to be a success. Even its
most ardent proponents in Brussels are not, at heart,
confident. A high level official from the European
Commission expressed fury to me about what he regarded
as Britain’s lack of courage. However, asked whether he
thought EMU would be a success, he said: “It had better
be, for all our sakes.”
Christopher Johnson makes extravagant claims for the
euroland economy. A long list of economic variables, he
says, will improve: growth, business investment, inflation,
trade, direct investment, portfolio investment. The one
economic variable that he doesn’t mention happens to be
euroland’s most damaging and intractable problem:
unemployment. The acid test of EMU’s success or failure
will be whether Europe can end its growth scelerosis and
begin to tackle mass unemployment. I remain to be
convinced that the ECB will deliver higher European
growth rates. Without that, unemployment will remain far
too high and EMU will become deeply divisive and
politically unpopular.
We would all like to see a European Union that, in a united
and competent way, challenged America’s virtual monopoly
on military and defence questions. Christopher Johnson
rightly says that the US does not have a monopoly of
wisdom on foreign policy. However, he appears to suggest
that Britain cannot play this role outside euroland. Why not?
EMU is a choice about monetary policy arrangements. It
should have no bearing on foreign policy choices. 
Finally, Christopher Johnson rolls out the well-worn
argument that, if Britain doesn’t like the way the rest of
Europe is developing, it is up to us to get in there and work
hard to change it. It is a reductio ad absurdum to argue that
Britain must give up influence in order to gain influence. As a
full member of the EU, Britain ought to be able to exert its
views outside euroland. If that is not the case, then euroland
is a deeply undemocratic beast that we should avoid.
have a bigger effect on output in the UK than in the other
countries; in two they have the same effect, and in nine
they have less effect. Interest rates have varied more in
the UK than elsewhere, but this means that moderate
interest rate changes are less effective, and that large
ones are needed.
Few existing uninational monetary unions are optimum
currency areas. The UK and the USA would both fail the
test. But the EU is moving in the right direction, with
policies to speed up the movement of capital – already
free in many respects – and of employees. So this is no
reason for not joining.
The ECB has to operate within the general EU policy
framework, so it cannot ignore objectives such as
employment and living standards. Its relaxed attitude to the
fall in the euro, and the 0.5% cut in the refin rate to 2%,
show that it is not skewed towards deflation.
The UK’s industrial structure cannot, in general, be more
modern that that of other leading European countries,
because their productivity is higher. The mix of industries
is remarkably similar, more so than across the United
States. Oil and gas extraction accounts for 2.2% of British
GDP, so this is not a sector in which any important
asymmetric shock could occur.
The idea that Britain would lose competitiveness by joining
EMU does not stand up. By most yardsticks, the UK is
way down the league. Greater competition within EMU
would improve competitiveness, not damage it.
It is a fallacy that the UK’s 31% corporation tax rate
means a low tax burden for industry. UK taxes on
corporate income and property are 6% of GDP, compared
with 2% in Germany. The UK’s effective rate of tax on
capital is, according to the OECD, the highest in Europe.
Let us by all means harmonize business taxes, if that
means bringing them down to the German level. Let us
level up to German wages – provided that we can emulate
German productivity and flexibility of working hours.
Britain does not have too little self-confidence, but too
much. Smugness about the economy is the besetting sin
of successive British Governments. New Labour had an
unusual bout of frankness in its first year, when it exposed
the depleted legacy of 18 years of Conservative
Government. Now, the espousal of Thatcherism by New
Labour is hardly the best basis on which to improve its
economic inheritance. Only a firm decision to join EMU
will break the mould.
JB continued
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t’s widely acknowledged that the world of business is
more competitive than ever before. Firms across the
globe compete fiercely with each other – to fall behind
these days is to threaten the survival of the company.
Yet in spite of all the talk of a shrinking world, a concept
many managers would readily accept, firms themselves
continue to be organised in radically different ways. The
structure of an American company, for example, is very
different from its Japanese competitors; different both in
the way it relates to the domestic economy and in the way
it is managed. Within Europe, national differences are often
surprisingly large.
It’s true that as firms interact more and more at the interna-
tional level, and find themselves facing similar problems
and pressures, these differences are likely to diminish:
there is already evidence for this. But what is it that makes
these firms so very different in the first place? Why is it that
in some countries, employees are more heavily protected in
terms of pay, job security and fringe benefits than in
others? Why do some companies seek to control every
aspect of their business while others rely much more
heavily on outsourcing and subcontracting? 
Market forces...
It’s perhaps stating the obvious to point out that the markets
– product, labour, and capital markets – in which firms
Why, in a global market, is there so much variation in the way firms are
organised and in the way they manage their workers? Howard Gospel
suggests that there is a wide range of factors at work – and that while
some have perhaps been overlooked in the past others are less
important than traditionally assumed.
Nations,
firms and
their workers
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operate are crucial in determining how they manage their
businesses. The size of a market, its geographical bound-
aries, and the degree of competition within those 
boundaries are all factors which play a part. Markets play a
part in determining how a firm organises its labour. Greater
competition – for labour, for instance – might lead large firms
to internalise the management of their workers: providing in-
house training, company level pay deals and so on. 
...aren’t the only influence
But other, equally powerful factors are at work. Within the
firm itself, what might be termed internal influences are at
work. Most obvious is the overall strategy and structure of
the firm. How the firm positions itself in the markets in
which it operates will have an important influence on how it
organises it workers. So too will its managerial structure. 
A firm which relies on a hierarchy of professional managers
will take a different view of its labour force than one which
is essentially still run by a tightly knit group at the top –
perhaps a family owned firm, for instance. Also important
will be the choice of technology a company uses, which 
in turn will have a direct bearing on the firm’s division 
of labour. 
Markets and firms are therefore of central importance:
other factors may also play a part at times. The state itself
has an important impact. It can, for instance, impose
regulatory requirements on the management of workers –
hiring and firing at will can be much more difficult in some
countries than others. Trade unions, too, are important
because of their ability to organise workers across firms
and industries: though there has in the past been a
tendency to overestimate their role. 
Labour strategies: internal v external
One useful way of looking at how firms manage labour is to
divide approaches into what we might call the internal and
external. In approaches to employment relations, for
example, some firms may build strong internal systems with
extensive training and company-specific wages and
benefits; while others may rely more on the market process.
In the area of work relations, some firms use subcontract-
ing – they externalise much of their labour management;
while others organise their production in-house using an
internal division of labour. For industrial relations it’s the
difference between some kind of bargaining arrangement at
the industry level – through employer associations, for
instance – and an internal works council or enterprise
bargaining approach. It’s important to remember, though,
By Howard Gospel
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that the distinction between internal and external is rarely
clearcut. Firms – and countries – tend to fall somewhere in
between the two extremes. What’s significant, therefore, is
where on the spectrum they fall.
Five countries compared
It’s much easier to see how these various factors come
together by examining how labour management has worked
– and how it has changed over time – in the major industrial
countries. In this way we can get some idea of how firms
differ across countries and over time; and some sense of
the common pressures at work which help shape the
modern firm.
Britain
From the late nineteenth century until the Second World
War, product markets in Britain were slow-growing,
fragmented both nationally and internationally. Labour
markets, for the most part, were well-stocked with unskilled
and semi-skilled labour. Financial markets were already
quite sophisticated, with a large stock exchange
and the beginnings of a market in corporate
control which resulted in periodic merger waves.
Most firms remained small, often family owned
and managed. Those large firms which did exist,
mainly as a result of mergers, were usually loosely
organised holding companies.
As a result, most British firms tended to exter-
nalise their labour management: many relied on
subcontracting and devolved control to craft
workers. They relied on the occupational labour
market system of apprentices and were slow to
develop in-house training arrangements. They hired and
fired as market conditions dictated; fixed wages by the
same criteria; and created only the most rudimentary
systems of wage differentials, along with minimal benefits
systems. They tended to deal with unions through employ-
ers’ associations which fixed wages for a whole trade or
industry and which processed grievances through external
disputes procedures.
Of course there were exceptions. Some firms, such as a
few large-scale employers in chemicals and mass
consumer goods, developed stronger internal systems.
These firms operated in larger product markets or 
where labour was more scarce or where firm-specific skills
were important.
Having started out on one path, it tended to be difficult for
firms to change course. But after 1945, British employers
did start to move, albeit slowly and unevenly, towards a
strategy of internalising the management of their workers.
They developed much more structured internal labour
systems. The challenges posed by tight postwar labour
markets and increased competition in product markets
acted as spurs to change. The last twenty years, however,
have seen the beginning of a reversion to strategies of
externalisation, especially in terms of work and employment
relations. More competitive product markets, slacker labour
markets and greater financial market pressures have all
tended to push firms in this direction. Outsourcing, subcon-
tracting and the use of temporary, part-time and contingent
working have all become much more common. 
France
Perhaps surprisingly, the history of the firm in France has
much in common with that in Britain. But French financial
markets were much less developed than those in Britain,
and the traditional enterprise, small and often family owned
and managed, survived much longer as the predominant
form. Those large firms which did emerge, however, were
more centralised than their British counterpart and more
likely to employ graduate engineers as managers. Mergers
played less of a role than they did Britain.
French firms tended to externalise their labour management
– laying off workers according to the business cycle for
instance; though they did this to a lesser extent than in
Britain. French employers strongly preferred not to deal
with trade unions, but when this was inevitable they chose
to bargain through employers’ associations, setting wages
at the industry level. As in Britain, there were exceptions to
the general rule and they tended to be in the same indus-
trial sectors – railways, electricity and some larger steel,
chemical and auto companies. Not only did these firms
operate in labour markets where new skills were in short
supply: they also tended to be those firms which were more
centrally coordinated and professionally managed.
For more than thirty years after the Second World War, the
management of French firms became increasingly inter-
nalised. In industrial relations, however, French employers
displayed uncertainty, even ambivalence, about their strate-
gies. Large firms both relied on external multi-employer
bargaining and also sought to develop company agree-
ments with trade unions. Only in the past twenty years or
so has there been an accelerated move towards company-
The last twenty years, however, have seen the beginning 
of a reversion to strategies of externalisation, especially
in terms of work and employment relations.
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specific systems of labour representation, usually with a
diminished role for outside trade unions.
The United States
In contrast with the British and French experience, the
movement towards internalisation of labour management
started much earlier in the United States. By the late
nineteenth century, the markets for many producer and
consumer goods had become mass markets. The market
for labour, especially skilled labour, was much tighter. Large
firms, including those which were the result of mergers,
were run increasingly by extensive hierarchies of salaried
managers. These firms were international leaders in devel-
oping mass production techniques and elaborate internal
divisions of labour.
Among small firms in traditional sectors, labour manage-
ment in the early twentieth century was externalised: based
on employment-at-will, apprenticeship training and bargain-
ing with craft unions through employers associations. The
big firms, though, increasingly came to impose internalised
arrangements on their employees. They developed their
own internal divisions of labour, with career, wage and
benefit hierarchies based on seniority and in-house training.
As unions grew from the 1930s onwards, big firms which
accorded them recognition usually insisted on bargaining at
plant or company level.
In the last decade or so, however, the drive towards inter-
nalisation has been reversed. Increased outsourcing, exten-
sive layoffs and a deterioration of internal benefit systems
has been driven by greater product market competition –
especially foreign competition; new patterns of demand in
labour markets; greater short-term financial market
pressures; and a wave of corporate restructuring which has
often led to looser forms of organisation.
Japan
Japanese firms went further and faster in the process of
internalisation. By the early twentieth century several large
companies, operating in protected national markets, had
emerged. These, for the most part, were centrally organ-
ised. Links to other companies and banks meant firms
relied little on the relatively small equity market. As they
adopted Western technologies, these firms created in-
house training and labour systems to attract scarce labour.
Initially, these tended to be restricted to managerial, white
collar and some skilled workers; but post 1945, Japanese
firms saw a considerable extension of this internalisation,
partly as a result of trade union pressure and collective
bargaining.
Such structures facilitated training and cooperation within
the enterprise, and enabled Japanese firms to move
towards so-called lean production systems. In the early
twentieth century and again immediately after 1945,
Japanese workers sought to create unions on general and
industrial lines; they did not succeed. Large employers
were the driving force behind enterprise-based unions and
bargaining.
It’s important to bear in mind, however, that the drive
towards internalisation in Japan has been accompanied by
related strategies of externalisation. The internal system for
some employees is dependent on the use of subcontract-
ing, part-time and temporary working patterns for others.
Though there has been some increased use of such
techniques of externalisation in recent years, they have not
so far been as pronounced as in Britain and the US.
Germany
The German experience falls somewhere between these
extremes. As far back as the late nineteenth century, large
firms in fast growing product markets introduced elaborate
division of labour in industries such as steel, chemicals, and
electrical products. These firms were centralised, function-
ally organised and employed quite sophisticated managerial
hierarchies. Unlike the US, where labour generally was in
short supply, or Japan, where skilled labour was scarce, in
Germany there was a reasonable supply of workers,
though with high turnover and some shortages in expanding
new sectors. Traditionally, the German labour markets for
skilled workers were organised on occupational lines
through apprenticeship training. Firms sought new finance
from the banking system rather than the equity markets. As
a result, firms tended to be insulated from the sort of finan-
cial market pressures encountered in other countries.
All this gave large German firms an incentive to internalise
In contrast with the British and French experience, the movement towards internalisation 
of labour management started much earlier in the United States. By the late nineteenth century,
the markets for many producer and consumer goods had become mass markets
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labour management and this they did: with in-house train-
ing and extensive benefits systems common, and with 
the early introduction in some companies of internal 
works committees. There were nevertheless some 
tendencies towards externalisation: in traditional metal
working, for instance, most initial training was through
occupational apprenticeship. 
For thirty years after the war, product markets were
buoyant and labour markets tight. Large firms remained
centralised. As in Japan – but unlike the Anglo-Saxon
countries – company growth was mainly internal and firms
were less subject to short-term financial pressures. Big
firms went for internalisation with more sophisticated
divisions of labour as they moved towards mass produc-
tion. Such companies offered secure jobs, good promotion
prospects and extensive fringe benefits. They also provided
internal training beyond the apprenticeship level. 
But there are two significant aspects of externalised labour
management in Germany: apprenticeship, organised at the
occupational level, remains strong; and wage agreements
are negotiated on a multi-employer industry basis. Germany
thus has a hybrid system of internal and external coordina-
tion which, while different from that in Japan, has certain
structural similarities. It’s true that in recent years there
have been pressures on this mix; pressures which have
tended to pull in opposite directions. Higher unemployment
and greater competition has led to some weakening of
internal labour markets, though the legal system combined
with union strength means this had not had such a
pronounced impact as in the US and the UK. At the same
time, multi-employer bargaining has come under pressure,
with firms tending to pay more attention to internal works
councils and company specific pay deals.
For the most part, then, large firms in these five major
countries can be seen fitting along a spectrum: with British
and French companies closer to the external end; the US
and Germany in the middle; and Japan near to the internal
extreme. It’s also clear that historical developments in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries played a significant
part in shaping these national differences. Looked at over
the long-term, however, it also becomes clear that all five
countries have seen some movement towards internalisa-
tion, especially in the thirty years or so after the second
world war. More recently this trend has become more
uneven, with signs of a reversal – though to varying
degrees – again, in all five countries.
Does it matter?
One important question is : do these differing strategies for
managing workers have any impact on the economic
performance both of firms and the national economies in
which they operate?
Strategies of externalisation do have some obvious advan-
tages. For the firm, they save on administrative costs and
provide flexibility both in terms of the numbers employed
and the wage bill. Where employers’ associations are
comprehensive and strong, they may be able to constrain
wage increases and thus allow the economy to be run at
relatively full capacity. But firms have less control over their
labour supply and over work organisation. Recruitment
costs are likely to be higher as is staff turnover at times
when the labour market is tight. Worker commitment to the
firm is also likely to be harder to develop under externalised
arrangements.
Strategies of internalisation have their disadvantages too.
They entail high fixed administrative costs which come with
a large workforce. It will obviously be harder to reduce the
workforce when times are difficult. For the employees, too,
there are downsides: as workers they are less mobile and
much more dependent on the firm. And for the national
economy, internalisation could mean a build-up of inflation-
ary wage pressures when firms do not coordinate wage
bargaining.
There is, however, recent evidence to suggest that some
types of employment contracts can bring greater employee
commitment and higher productivity: those which offer
greater job security, internal promotion, and pay and benefit
scales which reward workers according to their contribu-
tion rather than market forces. In the real world, what firms
seek – or should seek – is a mixture of internal and external
strategies which best meet their needs, those of their
workers and, therefore, those of the national economic
environment in which they operate.
Howard Gospel is Professor of Management at King’s College
London and a member of the CEP’s Labour Markets Programme.
What firms seek – or should seek – is a mixture of internal
and external strategies which best meet their needs, those 
of their workers and, therefore, those of the national
economic environment in which they operate.
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n the two years after Margaret
Thatcher took office in 1979, the
UK’s GDP fell by 3%, manufactur-
ing production by 15%, unemploy-
ment rose by a million, while inflation
had risen to 20% in 1980 before
starting to fall back. Britain was one
of the world leaders in strikes and
had just suffered the so-called Winter
of Discontent with a wide range of
public sector workers (including,
famously, grave-diggers) on strike,
after two crippling miners’ strikes and
an electricity workers’ strike had
marred three of the previous nine
winters.
Moreover, this was merely the culmi-
nation of a period of persistent UK
underperformance compared with
other countries. As I observed in
1988, “In the 1960s and early 1970s,
the OECD statistics for growth show
the UK growing about two thirds the
rates of the other industrialised
countries and in the mid-to late
1970s, despite the boost from rising
North Sea Oil production, this had
fallen to about half.”
Flash forward 20 years and the UK
still has problems but the perfor-
mance of the economy is widely
admired. Growth is currently
temporarily subdued, but an early
recovery with a trend rate above that
of the rest of Europe is expected not
only by Gordon Brown but by most
other forecasters. The CEBR’s
current forecasts show that even on
the official figures the UK economy is
likely to overtake the French
economy in size by 2003 and, after
allowing for the probable understate-
ment of the UK service sector in the
official statistics, may have already
done so. Inflation seems to have little
difficulty in holding to the official
target rate of 2.5%. Strikes in the UK
are largely for history students to
read about. 
Even The Guardian, hardly a
Thatcher-supporting newspaper in
her heyday, has concluded that “she
effected the change brutally, and with
Thatcherism-
twenty years on 
May 1999 saw the twentieth anniversary of
Margaret Thatcher’s arrival in 10 Downing St.
We asked Douglas McWilliams, chief executive
of the Centre for Economics and Business
Forecasting, for his assessment of the impact
Thatcherism had on the UK economy.
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great pain, but it was a change we
had to make. Our partners in Europe
are having to undergo that process
now; thanks to Thatcher, we were
ready for the global marketplace
sooner than they were.”
So there has been an undoubted
economic improvement. But how
much of the improvement can be
attributed to Thatcherism? And was
the collateral damage to society and
the economy greater than necessary
to achieve the desired results?
The problems were great
The UK ended the 1970s with three
key economic problems. The first
two were macroeconomic and inter-
related. Government borrowing was
excessive, running at over 5% of
GDP, and inflation was in double
digits and accelerating. The GDP
deflator ( a measure of inflation) rose
by 11.6% in 1978, 14.6% in 1979
and 19.4% in 1980.
The third problem was more micro-
economic - a structural supply-side
failure that had led to slow produc-
tivity growth. Even this arguably had
macroeconomic consequences –
slow growth of productivity had led
to slow growth of output that had
probably exacerbated the tensions
between expectations and reality
that had resulted in excessive
borrowing and inflation.
What Thatcher did
Thatcherism had three phases,
roughly coincident with Mrs
Thatcher’s three Parliaments. 
The first phase from 1979-83
focussed especially on the 
macroeconomic problems, bringing
public finances under control and
reducing inflation. But there were
also measures targeted at the
supply-side of the economy, 
such as trade union reforms, lower
marginal income tax rates and the
scrapping of wage, price, dividend
and exchange controls. Some 
initial moves were made to scale
back the public sector through
privatisation.
The key decision during this phase
was that not to reflate fiscally in
1981. Although based on Treasury
forecasts of public finances that
subsequently turned out wrong (as a
result there was in fact a fiscal relax-
ation in Autumn 1981) and although
monetary policy had already been
relaxed, the 1981 Budget had a
major psychological effect. It
convinced industrialists that they
were in a new world where economic
policy would not necessarily be
adjusted simply because the
economy had turned down.
The first phase achieved its objec-
tives, though with some luck and with
policy errors (such as the Clegg
awards that raised public sector pay
by nearly a third, and the hike in VAT
to 15%) that exacerbated the difficul-
ties in achieving them. The heavy
reliance on monetary policy to control
inflation at a time of public expendi-
ture growth meant that the interna-
tionally traded sector, in particular
manufacturing, bore the brunt of the
fight against inflation.
My mid-1980 assessment was that
Thatcherism’s only chance of
success was for Mrs Thatcher to be
reelected at least once, since her
main economic policy measures were
targeted at medium and long-term
improvements and would only show
negative effects within her first
Parliament. Many political experts
were not convinced that she would
survive beyond one term of office and
some suspected that she might not
even get that far.
Luck played a part
But Mrs Thatcher was lucky in her
opponents. General Galtieri attacked
the Falkland Islands when her
popularity was at its nadir – by the
time the Argentinean troops had been
repatriated to the mainland she had
become the most popular Prime
Minister for many years. As if this
was not enough, the Labour Party
chose Michael Foot as leader rather
than the much more formidable Denis
Healey, and the effects of this were
enhanced by the breakaway of the
‘Gang of Four’ to found the SDP
component of the Alliance. This
meant that the opposition to the
Conservatives was split into two
almost equal parts. Because of the
opposition split, Margaret Thatcher
could have won the 1983 election
with only 35% of the vote; because
of the post-Falklands rise in her
popularity she achieved 43.5% and
an overwhelming majority. This left
Thatcherism free to start to enjoy the
gradual emergence of the fruits of the
reforms that had taken place earlier.
The second phase of Thatcherism,
from 1983-87, was the most produc-
tive. With the macroeconomy sorted
out, the main focus was on the
supply-side. Privatisation, sales of
council houses, the 1984 Budget
reform of Corporation Tax and further
scaling back of the public sector took
place against the background of
accelerating growth. But, partly
because the supply-side reforms
boosted productivity, unemployment
remained stubbornly high.
Meanwhile, the 1983/84 miners’
dispute was costly in both financial
terms and social terms. But it symbol-
ised the reforms in the industrial
relations climate.
Mistakes were made
Again with the opposition split
(though less evenly) the
Conservatives easily won re-election
again in 1987 and the third phase of
Thatcherism started. This was the
point where the wrong decisions
started to outweigh the right ones.
Supply-side changes like the 1988
Budget cut in the top rate of tax to
40% and privatisations, contracting
out and the development of the
private finance initiative emerged. But
these were counter-balanced by an
unnecessary recession which had its
roots in a quasi-theological debate
between Mrs Thatcher and her
Chancellor Nigel Lawson about
whether to operate a monetary policy
The 1981 Budget had a major psychological effect. 
It convinced industrialists that they were in a new world 
where economic policy would not necessarily be adjusted 
simply because the economy had turned down.
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or an exchange rate policy. The
problems of the recession were
compounded by the Poll Tax, which
hit living standards (and boosted
inflation) at a time when the recession
was starting to bite. And Europe
started to become an almost impossi-
ble problem for the UK.
Thatcherism coincided with the
heyday of North Sea oil revenues and
with the emergence of the informa-
tion age. The first Apple personal
computers were sold in 1979 and the
personal computer came of age with
the original IBM PC in 1981. These
changes would have helped improve
the position of the UK economy
without Thatcherism. But it was the
mix of Thatcherite rhetoric, aggres-
sively pro-free markets, and
Thatcherite policies, which were a
much more cautious ‘Third Way’ mix
between liberalising markets and
preserving the welfare state, that
helped the UK take advantage of
these changes. Abolition of exchange
controls and the deregulation of the
City meant that businessmen were
forced to be productive; Thatcherite
rhetoric reminded them that they
needed to stand on their own two
feet. Meanwhile the technological
changes of the era gave them some
of the tools that they needed 
for success.
Not all good news
But, surprisingly for a former
Secretary of State for Education, 
Mrs Thatcher started to realise the
need to reform education to create
the skills to take full advantage of the
information age far too late. So
although the UK economy has
overtaken Italy and nearly caught up
with France, we remain some
distance behind West Germany in
the productivity stakes. And the 1998
McKinsey report indicates that the
UK is still insufficiently deregulated
and uncompetitive to achieve US
levels of productivity.
Armed with 20-20 hindsight, it is
clear that the benefits of Thatcherism
could have been bought more
cheaply. The macroeconomic stabili-
sation at the beginning of the 1980s
was achieved with only the traded
goods sector in the front line. As a
result, the pain suffered by this
important part of the economy was
excessive. Moreover, inflationary
pressure in the rest of the economy
continued and meant that a second
counter-inflationary battle had to be
fought at the beginning of the 1990s. 
And the problems of the early 1990s
were very much man-made. They
started with a pragmatic decision,
since Thatcher abhorred exchange
rate targets and Lawson was scepti-
cal of monetary targets, to compro-
mise by having neither a monetary
policy or an exchange rate policy.
Then, when it was clear that inflation
had got out of control, the introduc-
tion of the Poll Tax added fuel to the
flames. Finally, the extent of the asset
price deflation and the economic
consequences of fixing sterling to the
deutschemark at a time when reunifi-
cation spending was likely to push
German interest rates close to record
levels were not at all understood.
Sustainable recovery only emerged
after George Soros and his fellow
speculators pushed sterling out of
the European Exchange Rate
Mechanism.
But the cost of sorting out the UK’s
economic problems has been similar
to the price paid by other major
European economies. Indeed it is
arguable that both Italy and France
have paid a roughly equal price in
unemployment and lost growth to the
UK, despite more favourable starting
positions and moving less far along
the road to reform.
So the verdict on the Thatcher
economic policies has to be largely
favourable. But had the battle against
inflation in 1980 been fought by the
whole economy instead of the traded
sector, and had the early nineties
recession been largely avoided by
pre-emptive monetary action and a
clearer understanding of the impact
of indirect tax rises, the powerful
economic recovery of the mid- and
late-1990s could have taken place at
least five years earlier. If that had
happened, the Conservatives might
still be in office!
Douglas McWilliams is Visiting
Professor of Economics at Kingston
University and Chief Executive of the
Centre for Economics and Business
Research in London.
Thatcher started to realise the need
to reform education to create the
skills to take full advantage of the
information age far too late.
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ars, suicide bombs, assassinations, peace
treaties, the Middle East seems to have
had them all. But behind these events, are
economic factors that rarely attract the
attention of headline writers. Lasting
peace, though, depends on economic success. Make one
side rich and the other poor and you have a perfect recipe
for political disaster. In 1993 and 1994, when the peace
agreements between Israel and the Palestinians were
signed, many would have said that the economic founda-
tions for lasting peace were laid. 
But five years later hope has given way to disillusion.
Growth in the Palestinian territories has been disappoint-
ingly slow. The trade deficit has widened. The Palestinian
economy’s dependence on Israel remains as high as ever,
while border closures continue, putting further pressure on
the small and struggling economy. The promised land of
the economic take-off and lasting peace both look more
fragile than ever, the need to halt the decline more urgent.
Unequal partners
Israel can boast a modern dynamic economy comparable
to that of the richer European south. It has managed to
absorb large numbers of immigrants; it has a well qualified
workforce, low inflation and low unemployment; and a
standard of living comparable to that of Spain. The
Palestinians, too, at least when the oil rich states of the
Gulf are excluded, are moderately well-off by the standards
of other Arab countries: but the economy of their territories
has had too much to cope with for its size. In 1997, the
average income was about 1500 US dollars (in 1997
prices), about a tenth of that of Israel. The population is 2.5
million, compared with 6 million for Israel. The Palestinian
economy is only between 3 and 4% of that of Israel.
Economically, it is a very, very small brother.
In 1967, when
Israel occupied the lands that
now form the Palestinian territories,
the Palestinians had virtually no economic
relations with Israel. Indeed, even the two blocks of the
Palestinian territories, the West Bank and Gaza, had
almost no economic relations with each other, the former
looking east to Jordan and the latter south to Egypt.
Occupation severed all links with their respective Arab
neighbours and brought integration with the Israeli
economy. What happened next is a textbook example of
growth through association with a more advanced
economy. Israel needed labour, which the Palestinians had
in abundance. Palestinians worked mainly in construction in
Israel, needed to house new immigrants and to provide the
infrastructure for the industrialising society, and in agricul-
ture and low-skill service jobs. With the money they earned
they bought goods produced in Israel. A flow of labour
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from the Palestinian territories to Israel was matched by a
flow of goods from Israel to the territories and supported a
fast expansion of Palestinian living standards.
In addition to the demands of the Israelis for unskilled
labour, Palestinians were fortunate enough to have access
to the oil rich economies of the Gulf. When the price of oil
went up in 1973 and large scale economic expansion
started in the Gulf states, skilled Palestinians emigrated
there in their thousands. The income they earned was
either deposited in banks outside Palestine (and much of it
is still there), or it was sent back to provide more support
for economic expansion. Between 1968 and 1980, national
income in the Palestinian territories grew at an astonishing
12.5% per year. But at the onset of the 1980s, Israeli
expansion slowed down, the initial gains from reconstruc-
tion after the occupation were exhausted, and oil revenues
in the Gulf stagnated. Palestinian growth collapsed to 2.5%
per year, hardly able to keep up with population growth.
Stagnation brought the Intifada in 1988 and further
economic hardships followed political uncertainties, strikes
and the repression of economic activity. Coupled with this,
the outbreak of the Gulf War in 1991 found the Palestinians
backing the wrong side and paying for it after the war with
mass repatriations. Israel imposed its own restrictions on
Palestinian labour, through the now famous (or infamous,
depending on your point of view) border closures: Israeli
security forces do not allow Palestinians to cross into Israel
to go to their jobs because of fear of terrorism. So from a
situation where Palestinians had access to two rich labour
markets, the Israeli one to the north and west and the Gulf
one to the east, they were left with neither: no source of
outside funds and no domestic employment. Although
statistics at this point become unreliable, there is no doubt
that Palestinian output fluctuated painfully, on average
either falling or rising only slightly. Unemployment and
under-employment became common.
Peace and economic prosperity?
It is in this environment that the peace agreements of 1993
were signed. The economic framework for relations
between Israel and the Palestinian territories was written in
what is known as the Paris Protocol, signed in Paris in
1994. The Protocol created a customs union with some
modifications. Goods were to be freely traded between
Israel and the Palestinian territories, which were to have a
common external tariff. Employment of Palestinians in Israel
was to continue but at the discretion of the Israeli employ-
ment service (and the security forces). The same national
insurance taxes were to apply to Palestinians as to Israelis,
but, because Palestinians were not allowed to settle and
claim benefits in Israel, most of the revenue
collected from Palestinians
by Christopher Pissarides and Veronique Kessler
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was to be passed on to the Palestinian Authority. Some tax
harmonization in VAT was to be observed and in practice
VAT rates have been the same in the territories as in Israel.
Finally, the new Israeli shekel (NIS) was to continue as the
currency of the Palestinian territories, though the Jordanian
dinar and the US dollar also continued to circulate. In
practice, the NIS is used to finance most day to day transac-
tions but most savings in banks are kept in Jordanian dinars
or US dollars.
The challenges facing the Palestinian economy at the time of
the signing of the Peace Agreements and the Paris Protocol
were clear. Although the economy of the territories benefited
from the association with Israel after the occupation, devel-
opment was unbalanced and fragile. The combination of
restrictions in the free flow of goods imposed by Israel, the
weak and sometimes hostile regulatory environment and
uncertainties surrounding the future political status of the
territories prevented the growth of private investments in the
Palestinian economy. The high investment rates in the terri-
tories, around 30% of GDP in the West Bank and 40% in
Gaza by the mid-1980s, were predominantly in housing and
were noticeably absent in the private productive sector.
Rather than Palestinian or Israeli capital coming to the cheap
labour populating the occupied territories, cheap Palestinian
labour went to Israel (with skilled labour going to the Gulf):
productive activity in the Palestinian territories stagnated.
High hopes, anyway
The ambitions behind the Paris Protocol were to improve
productive activity by transforming the Palestinian economy
from the forced and distorted integration with Israel to a
self-supporting exporting economy. The Protocol was
meant to create the necessary conditions to stimulate
growth in labour-intensive sectors and to improve the trade
position by promoting export industries, developing efficient
import substitution, and encouraging diversification. Export
growth was seen as a potentially important source of new
job creation, although there was still hope that Israel would
not close the door completely to the employment of
Palestinian labour. The key idea behind the Protocol was to
provide a framework for growth in the Palestinian economy
supported by the free movement of goods instead of the
free movement of labour.
But there were also high hopes elsewhere. The new auton-
omy gradually given to the Palestinian Authority was
expected to lead to policies geared to the needs of the
Palestinian economy, not ones borrowed from Israel.
Although flexibility in monetary policy was limited, the use of
foreign currencies was beneficial in that it acted as a check
on domestic inflation and interest rates and provided the
monetary stability necessary for the repatriation of
Palestinian capital that would eventually lead to the creation
of a Palestinian employment base. There was euphoria as
the busy reconstruction boom to house the new administra-
tion went under way.
Hopes not realised…
But difficulties soon emerged. Domestic output has only
managed a disappointing average of 2.8% growth per year.
After an initial surge, annual export growth has slackened to
a mere 5.6%, a very poor performance when compared to
the ambitions of the Paris Protocol. Although imports have
not grown much since the initial boom of 1995, the trade
deficit has widened. Diversification in external trade has not
taken place, and the Palestinian economy’s dependence on
Israel remains as high as ever. Border closures continue
and Israel has imported cheap foreign labour from Asia and
East Europe to take its unskilled jobs, shutting off a steady
source of Palestinian incomes. Despite very generous
amounts of official transfers to the Palestinians (averaging
11.6% of GNP over the period 1993-98) from donors
anxious to see peace in the Middle East, the current
account deficit has grown to an astonishing 18 -19% of
GNP over the last three years. Unless these trends are
reversed, the Palestinian economy is threatened with a
spiral of increasing external debt and economic stagnation. 
…so who’s to blame?
Given the realities of Middle East politics, the Paris
Protocol itself can hardly be blamed for the disappointing
outcome. To get Israel and the Palestinians to agree to it
was a far bigger achievement than any design failures that
close and uncharitable scrutiny might reveal. The key
problems lie in politics, the deteriorating relations between
the two sides and the poor adherence to the Protocol that
followed: put starkly, Israeli security considerations,
irrespective of whether they are justified or not, have
hijacked economic objectives. The closures and work-
permit policies pursued by Israel since 1993 have shut off
The ambitions behind the Paris Protocol were to improve productive activity
by transforming the Palestinian economy from the forced and 
distorted integration with Israel to a self-supporting exporting economy.
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Israeli employment to thousands of Palestinians. Perhaps
worse for the longer term, they have also blocked the
access of Palestinian producers to the outside world.
Security considerations have also raised numerous indirect
obstacles to Palestinian trade with Israel and the rest of the
world. The Joint Economic Committee, set up after the
Paris agreements to iron out any difficulties in the imple-
mentation of the protocol, has become paralysed by politi-
cal considerations.
The consequences have damaged the prospects for the
long term prosperity of the Palestinian economy. Border
closures, and the uncertainty surrounding them, have led to
the wrong kind of adjustment in the fledgling economy.
Correcting these when the political climate improves will
not be easy. Import monopolies have been created in a
domain where competition is at the heart of the success.
Private firms importing from the rest of the world resorted
to traditional indirect Israeli routes and intermediaries rather
than direct routes, which are fraught with obstacles. As a
consequence, the Palestinian Authority is losing important
customs revenues. The entire Palestinian economy is now
caught in a vicious circle. Security-related obstacles are
impeding trade; they are making Palestinian industry
uncompetitive; and they are discouraging private investors
from financing the promised export-oriented economy.
Private investment in the export sector has stagnated,
preventing job creation. This in turn feeds into the political
process, killing the will to work for peace and breeding
discontent and enmity.
Many criticisms have been raised against the Protocol
itself. The milder ones have spotted ambiguities and
defects in some of its provisions, while the more ferocious
ones have challenged the heart of the compromise, the
establishment of a customs union between Israel and the
Palestinian territories. But political considerations have
ultimately killed the initial optimism. The risks ahead are
now greater.
Economic dependence on Israel is 
here to stay…
It would be unrealistic to quarrel with Israel’s security
concerns. Any attempt to deal with a potentially acceptable
solution has to recognise them as a permanent feature of
the landscape. But the economy of the Palestinian territo-
ries will depend on the Israeli economy for its well-being, at
least for the foreseeable future. How can these conflicting
interests be reconciled? Improving the design of security
measures and procedures, making them more transparent
to the Palestinians and outside bodies, such as the
European Union and World Trade Organisation, could go a
long way towards removing the Palestinians’ suspicions
that Israel is using security as a pretext to strangle their
economy. The ability to move Palestinian goods across the
borders with Israel is of paramount importance. Since Israel
agreed to this, arbitration by the World Trade Organisation
in cases of dispute and help in the resolution of ambiguities
is an obvious route to the building up of mutual trust. With
the same basic aim, administrative procedures and institu-
tional infrastructure, related to customs clearance, the issue
of import licenses, ensuring that standards are enforced
and other similar factors, can all be improved.
The movement of labour and the employment of
Palestinians in Israel is also a measure that can provide a
source of income for the Palestinians and a source of
revenue for the Palestinian Authority, through the tax
collected and passed on by the Israeli authorities. It is also
a bridge that can build more trust. The issuing of some
closure-immune permits has already taken place but their
number is still very small. Expansion of this measure can
help both sides in a sensitive area.
but more self-sufficiency would help…
Direct access from the Palestinian territories to the outside
world, without having to go through Israel, and also
between the various fragmented parts of the Palestinian
territories, is also important. Improving the infrastructure is
the key to achieving this. The Gaza airport is now opera-
tional, as President Clinton showed the world during his
recent visit, but it does not yet carry goods – or people – on
a commercial basis. The Gaza Industrial Estate is also
built, but no industries are
yet established there. A
commercial port is badly
needed, as are roads,
customs facilities and
telecommunications systems.
…as would more outside involvement
The European Union is a major trading partner of Israel. It is
also potentially a major trading partner of the Palestinian
economy, and an important donor of aid. Its economic clout
in the area makes it a strong candidate for the role of inter-
mediary as well as an adviser on economic issues and on
the implementation of the economic agreements. But such
a role also calls for an active involvement in the design, the
financing and the realisation of any project aiming to estab-
lish direct links between the Palestinian economy and the
rest of the world. Many have criticised the European Union
in the past for failing to respond fast enough to avert
conflict on its doorstep. The hope is that with the lessons
learned elsewhere, it will act more quickly this time, before
it is too late.
Christopher Pissarides is Professor of Economics at the LSE
and a member of the CEP’s Technology and Growth Programme.
Veronique Kessler is senior economist at the World bank,
currently on leave. They are both consultants to the European
Commission. The views expressed in this article are their own and
do not necessarily reflect those of the Commission.
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T
echnology, intellectual
property, and social
efficiency: any debate with
that many syllables strung
together makes the subject
under discussion a distant thing,
slightly outside the event horizon for
most of us. Wonderful technical
developments might, indeed, be
unfolding in the weightless economy.
Social observers might, indeed, be
attempting to place perspective on
and come to grips with the large-
scale changes that they think impor-
tant and profound. But why should a
proverbial rider on the Clapham
omnibus care?
I have previously argued in this
column and elsewhere that the
weightless economy is a technologi-
cal development that matters
because it slings the hapless
consumer right up against the chalk-
face of frontier technical change.
Sure, the economy has always been
knowledge-based. But in the old days
scientists, engineers, and inventors
plied their trade in laboratories hidden
from the consumer. And we preferred
it that way. We walked into stores
and bought the fruits of that intellec-
tual labour. New products had
technology and knowledge embed-
ded in them, but we never needed to
be hit over the head with this fact.
Individuals plugged in, turned on,
rode in, swallowed down, or
shrugged off. The knowledge-based
economy? We hardly knew ye. And
to understand economic performance
in such a world? Policymakers and
observers could well relegate
technology, knowledge, and science
to mere footnotes.
Now, however, daily newspapers are
not shy about putting on the nation’s
breakfast tables feature articles about
open-source computer operating
systems, about gene sequencing,
and about encryption policy. New
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releases of operating systems are
rolled out in sparkling media events
complete with rock stars, world
tours, and theme music. What is an
operating system anyway, and why
does anyone care enough to spend
millions of dollars to tell us there is a
new one of those available? Answer:
a string of 1s and 0s. The 0s have
been put in a different part of the
string this time, and, oh, a couple
million new 1s have been sprinkled in
the middle, not all together though.
The millions of dollars spent on the
coming out party? Because you’re
worth it.
This is stuff no longer arcane, intangi-
ble, and visionary. It is no longer
about propeller heads getting their
hands dirty on a keyboard, coding in
a nifty new hack to squeeze ever
more performance out of 2k RAM on
a board with flashing lights. Nor
about old men and women in white
laboratory coats, tinkering. Nor about
brainy social misfits, poring over
tables of unintelligible markings, while
beautiful debutantes carry translation
chits back and forth in blacked-out
Bletchley Park.
No, this is now everyone’s bread and
butter. When did we all become such
techno-geeks? Who brought us
centre stage and why? What do we
need to know about these changes to
understand economic performance? 
You’re part of it
In March 1999 IBM announced it
would no longer advertise on
websites failing to announce an
explicit privacy policy on data
collected from web browsing activity.
Even if IBM intends to spend only
$60m on online ads this year,
peanuts compared to the billion-dollar
exchanges now routine for Internet
deals, IBM is still the number two
Internet advertiser, and the money is
not exactly funny money.
Apparently, collecting information
about who does what is contentious,
and those with economic resources
that matter take it very seriously. And
this is collecting data about you, the
consumer, the user, the Web surfer.
The one who rides that omnibus. You
and information about you are what
this discussion revolves around.
In the recent uproar over the Melissa
computer virus, it emerged that
Microsoft assigns unique identifiers
to its Office suite of programs. Thus,
when a user produced a new
document on a machine using a
particular copy of Word, that
document was thereafter tagged and
identified. On the one hand, this
allowed tracking down the possible
perpetrator of a heinous crime. On
the other hand, we now realise there
is a shining trail of indelible bread-
crumbs marking out the uniqueness
in the each of us, amidst the swarm
of information ebb and flow that is
modern economic activity.
Intel had achieved the same identifi-
cation in hardware with its latest
processor chips that sit hidden in our
computers. Thus, the same goal is
attained. There continues debate on
whether this feature can be deacti-
vated. But the fact of the matter is,
one way or another, the electronic
information that we produce is indeli-
bly stamped with a version of our
identity.
Software programs can be obtained
freely on the Internet that would
enable my computer to sniff the bytes
traversing the LSE network. It would
be a simple matter for me to log Web
traffic. Not that I would ever do this,
of course. 
Why does anyone bother?
I don’t do it, but plenty of others do,
evidently. DejaNews, a net search
engine and early provider of easy
Web access, was recently publicised
to be – inadvertently or otherwise –
keeping records on who was sending
e-mail to whom.
On a level further up, the 1998
European Union Directive on Data
Protection recognized the importance
of consistent transnational statutory
stances on record-keeping and infor-
mation-use. Without this harmonisa-
tion, European consumers might be
averse to allowing their information
into commercial circulation in the first
place. By default, the lowest common
denominator – the tightest security –
would emerge as the focal point and
defacto standard. This can only
restrict the further development of
useful information systems. But in
attempting to harmonise statutes
across European member states, the
EU directive became inconsistent
with free information flow outside the
European Union, and in particular,
towards the United States. For
companies in the business of slinging
information back and forth across the
Atlantic – banks, financial houses,
insurance companies, even academic
establishments – this is a serious
barrier to cross-country operation.
OK, enough examples. What are the
general lessons to draw? First, what
passes for wealth-creating activity in
the weightless economy is easily
monitored. The technology itself facil-
itates that. We don’t know everything
about that which is payoff-relevant,
but we know a lot, enough to worry
lawyers and policy-makers. When
advertisers want to know where to
direct their spending dollars, they
seek measurements to find out how
effective their Web ads have been.
Despite all the insidious technological
capabilities I described above, the
principal complaint is that not enough
precise information is being
collected. Companies like Media
Metrix – a market leader in monitoring
Web traffic – undersample relevant
populations, and are unable to detect
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when advertising has been truly
effective. It seems to me that these
complaints are no worse than for
traditional advertising, but the
technology promises more, and so
dissatisfaction is easier to generate.
Second, more controversy appears
to arise when information is collected
online than when it is otherwise
obtained. All legal economic transac-
tions in countries where VAT
operates are already tagged and the
information used. For most of us,
cash exchanges are an ever-smaller
part of economic life. Exchange done
otherwise – through checks, credit
cards, or other methods of account-
ing – can be easily cross-referenced
to obtain very precise pictures on our
spending patterns.
In national surveys that all social
scientists use, people actually volun-
teer to keep diaries on what they do,
what they eat, how they spend their
time. Sure, in one case, online activi-
ties are recorded without the individ-
ual’s explicit consent, while in the
other, the surrender of information is
voluntary. But this can make a differ-
ence only if, in the second case, the
volunteer lies or otherwise alters his
behaviour. No one wants to contem-
plate that possibility.
What then is special about this
participation of the masses in activi-
ties in a weightless economy? 
Economically valuable
mass information 
Information about consumers now
can not only be sliced and diced 
to yield statistical trends and 
generalisations. They can also be
exploited to provide customized
products in a way that is economi-
cally profitable now but not so
before. The customer becomes part
of the value chain through his or her
characteristics. Thus, everyone helps
engineer progress in the weightless
economy through their simply being a
consumer of these products.
Knowledge-products in the weight-
less economy are not just infinitely
expansible, they are similarly
malleable and adjustable. Sure, the
auto industry will sell you a car with
add-ons that then distinguish this car
from the next, but there is only a fixed
set of templates from which
customization can draw. Indeed, the
logic of mass production in such
industries is that customization is
necessarily limited. By contrast,
computer software, biotech pharma-
ceuticals, and video entertainment
can be tailored to fit each customer’s
characteristics, and without much
more in extra cost. This product
differentiation represents non-price
competition and is, in fact, a move in
the direction of social efficiency.
People are different, and acknowl-
edging those differences in the provi-
sion of goods and services removes
the social efficiency losses associ-
ated with monopoly profit-maximisa-
tion.
At the same time, if the customization
is then frozen in the product, the
problem of market price tending
towards zero marginal cost under
perfectly competitive markets is
alleviated. No one else finds useful
the cheap knock-off copy of the
string of 1s and 0s that has been
specially developed for just me. The
developer of weightless economy
products does not find her ex-ante
incentives at odds with the subse-
quent market outcome.
In this view, increased precision of
information capture – whether
through Internet audit trails, medical
records, or brandname loyalty cards
– is a natural and healthy market-
driven solution that has emerged to
deal with the allocation and competi-
tion problems otherwise inherent in a
newly-developing weightless
economy.
Many observers, of course, take a
less positive view on this information
proliferation through the consumer’s
inadvertent actions. That debate on
privacy and information in a weight-
less economy then sometimes
garners rhetoric such as the need to
protect the “fundamental rights and
freedoms of natural persons”. Now I
don’t know what an unnatural person
is, but there might well be an
economic question surrounding
ownership of the intellectual property
rights on my shopping patterns. Or
on the genetic information in my
spleen cells. Or that in the population
of Iceland.
There is certainly an opposing
economic argument to the sanguine
one above that can be developed.
The next column will seek to investi-
gate exactly that. 
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